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The authors focus on the relation between group membership and procedural justice. They argue that
whether people are socially included or excluded by their peers influences their reactions to unrelated
experiences of procedural justice. Findings from 2 experiments corroborate the prediction that reactions
to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures are affected more strongly when people are included in a
group than when they are excluded from a group. These findings are extended with a 3rd experiment that
shows that people who generally experience higher levels of inclusion in their lives respond more
strongly to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures. It is concluded that people’s reactions to procedural
justice are moderated by people’s level of inclusion in social groups.
Social justice is a fundamental norm in everyday life. People are
strongly affected by acts that they perceive to be fair or unfair
(Folger, 1984). Social justice therefore is a key issue to the
understanding of social behavior, rightfully leading social psychol-
ogists to study questions such as what people perceive as fair and
how perceived fairness affects people’s reactions (for an overview,
see Lind & Tyler, 1988). A major orientation in social psycholog-
ical research on social justice is how people react to the perceived
fairness of decision-making processes. This study of procedural
justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) is an important topic in social
psychology, as research over the past 25 years has shown that
perceived procedural justice has the potential to strongly affect a
wide range of people’s perceptions and behaviors in many social
situations (for overviews, see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Cro-
panzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; Cropanzano, Rupp,
Mohler, & Schminke, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind &
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).
An illustration of a widely known procedural justice phenome-
non is the finding that people evaluate procedures that allow them
an opportunity to voice their opinions in decision-making pro-
cesses to be more fair than procedures that do not allow them such
an opportunity (Folger, 1977; Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Cork-
ran, 1979; cf. Brockner et al., 1998; Van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind,
1998; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002). Voice proce-
dures often exert such positive effects even if it is clear to recip-
ients that their opinions cannot affect the final decision (see, e.g.,
Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990). Furthermore, voice procedures
positively influence several of people’s perceptions and behaviors,
such as satisfaction ratings, relational judgments, protest inten-
tions, and task performance (for overviews, see Folger & Cropan-
zano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler &
Lind, 1992). These effects of voice are among the most frequently
replicated effects in social psychology (Brockner et al., 1998) and
therefore constitute a crucial element in theorizing on procedural
justice.
Because procedural justice essentially is a social phenomenon
(Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992), it has been argued
that information about people’s group membership contributes
substantially to social psychologists’ understanding of the psychol-
ogy of voice (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Several theories have empha-
sized the pivotal role of group membership in procedural justice
processes (for overviews, see Cropanzano et al., 2001; Folger &
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Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000;
Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Smith, 1998; Van den Bos & Lind,
2002; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, in press). For exam-
ple, it has been shown that procedural justice affects people’s
reactions more strongly if the procedures have been provided by
in-group rather than by out-group authorities (Smith, Tyler, Huo,
Ortiz, & Lind, 1998; Ståhl, Van Prooijen, & Vermunt, 2004) and
that people who identify strongly with a group are affected more
strongly by procedural justice than people who do not identify
strongly with a group (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996). Further-
more, procedural justice has been shown to be more important to
people in within-culture interactions than in between-cultures in-
teractions (Tyler, Lind, Ohbuchi, Sugawara, & Huo, 1998). These
empirical findings show that different aspects of group member-
ship moderate people’s reactions to procedural justice, which
suggests a fundamental relation between group membership and
procedural justice.
In the literature, the most prominent theoretical perspective on
procedural justice that has tried to explain these group membership
effects is the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992; cf.
Lind & Tyler, 1988). One of the basic assumptions of this model
is that group memberships are important to people because they
provide a solid basis for, among other things, a sense of belonging,
security, self-esteem, social identity, and validation of one’s
worldviews (Lind & Tyler, 1988; cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see
also Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Brewer, 1991). People therefore
want to know to what extent they are perceived as respected
members in valued social groups. Because people perceive group
authorities as representative for the group (Tyler & Lind, 1992),
people derive important information about their group membership
from the way that group authorities treat them. For example, it has
been argued that fair procedures may convey symbolic messages
of inclusion in a group, whereas unfair procedures may convey
symbolic messages of exclusion from a group (Lind, 2001; Lind &
Tyler, 1988). If group authorities treat people with dignity, people
infer that they are respected members within the group and that
there is good reason to have pride in their group membership. If
group authorities treat people rudely, people infer that they are not
well-respected members within the group and that there is no valid
reason to have pride in their group membership (Tyler, Degoey, &
Smith, 1996).
Although theorizing on the relational model (Tyler & Lind,
1992; cf. Lind & Tyler, 1988) and subsequent empirical work
within this tradition (e.g., Huo et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1998; Ståhl
et al., 2004; Tyler et al., 1998) has led to an increased understand-
ing of group memberships and procedural justice, we argue here
that there is also at least one considerable lacuna in this domain.
That is, in our opinion one of the most fundamental aspects of
group membership has not been sufficiently studied in relation to
procedural justice: Whereas the relational model has predomi-
nantly focused on people’s reactions to the actions of group
authorities (Tyler & Lind, 1992), reactions to the actions of peers
have been largely neglected in procedural justice research. One of
the reasons why we think this is important is because it may well
be argued that people’s group membership often is determined by
the extent to which people are socially included or excluded by
their peers (e.g., Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000; Williams,
1997; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). People sometimes can
only become and remain members of a group if their fellow group
members approve of it. To illustrate, we often can become and
remain members of a group of friends only with a group that
accepts us as friends and not with groups that have rejected us. The
extent to which people are included in social relationships or
groups has been labeled “group belongingness” and also has been
referred to as “level of inclusion” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).
People’s group belongingness (or level of inclusion) can be re-
garded as a specific but central aspect of people’s group member-
ship and may often be a prerequisite for people’s social relation-
ships and group memberships in everyday life. In the current
article, we argue that level of inclusion may have consequences for
people’s reactions to procedural justice. In the following, we
describe the psychology of group belongingness, integrate this
with the procedural justice literature, and derive our hypotheses.
Group Belongingness and Procedural Justice
Why do people want to affiliate with other people? One of the
answers to this question is the theory that humans have a natural
drive to form and maintain at least a number of positive, affective,
and stable interpersonal bonds. Baumeister and Leary (1995) re-
ferred to this fundamental human motivation to affiliate with
others as the need to belong. According to these authors, people
have to be included in meaningful social relationships to satisfy
their need to belong. The theory of the need to belong has its roots
in evolutionary theories, as the desire to form and maintain rela-
tions with others may have both survival and reproductive benefits
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The need to belong has been argued
to be universal, to produce effects readily and under a huge variety
of conditions, and to affect various perceptions and behaviors.
Being deprived from a satisfactory level of inclusion may be cause
of several negative effects, such as anxiety, emotional distress,
loneliness, and health problems (for an overview, see Baumeister
& Leary, 1995; see also Leary & Baumeister, 2000).
One of the most prominent threats to group belongingness is
social exclusion. It has been argued that being excluded by valued
social groups ranks among the most aversive of human experi-
ences (e.g., Gardner et al., 2000; Nezlek, Kowalski, Leary,
Blevins, & Holgate, 1997; Williams, 1997; Williams et al., 2000;
Williams & Sommer, 1996). The study of social exclusion has
therefore received considerable attention from social psychologists
in recent years. Research has shown that being socially excluded is
associated with strong negative emotions, such as anxiety, depres-
sion, hostility, jealousy, and loneliness (Nezlek et al., 1997; cf.
Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Leary, 1990). Furthermore, it has been
argued that social exclusion is reflected in people’s self-esteem
(Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs,
1995), that social exclusion promotes aggressive behavior
(Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001), and that negative
reactions to social exclusion are very similar across cultures
(Hazan & Shaver, 1994).
Several authors have argued that social inclusion and exclusion
are related to acts of fairness or unfairness. For example, Opotow
(1990) argued that every individual has a psychological boundary
for social justice, to which she referred to as the “scope of justice”
(Deutsch, 1974). According to Opotow, people tend to apply
general principles of fairness relatively more to those who are
included in their scope of justice (e.g., those who are included in
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their own social category or group) than to those who are excluded
from their scope of justice. As a consequence, harming people who
are excluded from the scope of justice is not necessarily perceived
to be unfair by the actor; indeed, it may even seem to be the
appropriate or desirable type of behavior. This phenomenon is
labeled “moral exclusion”, and it illustrates that social exclusion
may sometimes imply exclusion from basic moral rights such as
fairness (Huo, 1997). Moral exclusion may be an important psy-
chological factor to explain a wide range of collective human
tragedies (Opotow, 1990), such as the Holocaust and the ethnic
purifications in former Yugoslavia.
The moral exclusion literature takes the perspective of the actor
by focusing on how fairly or unfairly actors may behave toward
someone that they have morally included or excluded, and it
suggests that social inclusion and exclusion may indeed be related
to acts of fairness or unfairness. In the current article, we do not
focus on the moral exclusion construct but focus on the relation
between social exclusion and procedural justice from a different
angle. That is, empirical research has hitherto neglected how
people react to procedural (in)justice when they have been socially
included or excluded by their peers. In the current research we
would like to try to fill this void. Building on the relational model
(Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992) and empirical findings
within the tradition of the relational model (Huo et al., 1996; Smith
et al., 1998; Ståhl et al., 2004; Tyler et al., 1998), we argue here
that people’s own level of inclusion in a group has important
consequences for how people react to procedural fairness. More
specifically, the relational model has argued that fair procedures
from authorities convey symbolic messages of inclusion, because
procedural fairness implies that one is a respected and valued
member within a group (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992).
Thus, the perceived fairness of the procedures adopted by author-
ities may affirm people’s level of inclusion in social groups. In
correspondence with this perspective, fair procedures can provide
positive and stable intragroup relationships, but unfair procedures
can easily lead groups or relationships to disintegrate (Lind &
Tyler, 1988). On the basis of this, we argue here that one of the
reasons why group memberships and procedural justice are related
is because procedural fairness can be functional to maintain peo-
ple’s level of inclusion in social groups and to avoid the negative
consequences that are associated with social exclusion.
On the basis of this line of reasoning, it can be expected that
people respond differently to procedures following an experience
of inclusion by peers than following an experience of exclusion by
peers. We suppose that an experience of social inclusion by peers
is cognitively and behaviorally associated with social norms that
are relevant to one’s level of inclusion (Baumeister & Leary, 1995;
cf. Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Furthermore, a social norm that is
very relevant to one’s level of inclusion is procedural justice, given
that procedural justice may convey symbolic messages of inclu-
sion (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). As a consequence,
we argue that people should be relatively more sensitive to fair
procedures (such as voice procedures) when they experience high
as opposed to low levels of inclusion. We therefore predicted that
participants would be affected more strongly by voice as opposed
to no-voice procedures following inclusion in a group by their
peers than following exclusion from a group by their peers.
To investigate the effects of voice under varying levels of
inclusion, we conducted three experiments. We now introduce the
first two experiments, in which we directly manipulated social
inclusion versus exclusion by peers. In these first two experiments
reported, participants were members of a group. In both experi-
ments, we raised the possibility that participants could be excluded
from the group: Participants were informed that either they or one
other specific participant would be excluded from the group and
that the remaining group members would choose which of these
two members would be included and which would be excluded.
We then manipulated group belongingness: Participants were ei-
ther included in the group or excluded from the group, or it was not
yet known whether they would be included or excluded. This
manipulation of group belongingness was followed by a manipu-
lation of procedure: We varied whether the participants were or
were not allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion in a
decision-making process. To make sure that our experimental
manipulations were orthogonal to each other and that the proce-
dure manipulation was perceived similarly in the three group-
belongingness conditions, the authority did versus did not allow
participants to voice their opinions about a decision that was
unrelated to participants’ group membership and the group-
belongingness manipulation, and the authority was not a member
of the participant’s group. Thus, people received voice or not about
a decision that was equally relevant for included and excluded
participants.
For tentative purposes, we also induced a condition in which it
was not yet known whether the participant would be included or
excluded. Current theoretical perspectives can lead to two possible
predictions about this condition. The first possible prediction is
based on the observation that participants in the not-yet-known
conditions are still members of the group. This would imply that
participants would perceive themselves to be more included in the
group than participants in the exclusion condition. Furthermore,
these participants may perceive themselves to be less included in
the group than would those in the inclusion condition, as it is
unclear whether the former participants can remain group mem-
bers in the future. In other words, participants may experience the
highest level of inclusion in the inclusion condition, a somewhat
lower level of inclusion in the not-yet-known condition, and the
lowest level of inclusion in the exclusion condition. It can there-
fore be argued that reactions to procedures of participants in the
not-yet-known condition would be somewhat weaker than in the
inclusion condition and somewhat stronger than in the exclusion
condition.
However, an alternative prediction would state that not yet
knowing whether one will be included or excluded enhances
feelings of uncertainty. It has been argued that subjective human
uncertainty can increase the need to be categorized into social
groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Hogg & Mullin, 1999) and is thus
interwoven with people’s group memberships. Furthermore, un-
certainty is a crucial element in social–cognitive models of pro-
cedural justice, such as fairness heuristic theory (for overviews,
see Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & De Vera Park, 1993; Van den Bos,
Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke,
2001) and the related uncertainty management model (Van den
Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). Theoretical and empirical
work following these frameworks has suggested that people are
especially affected by fairness in situations that make them feel
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uncertain (for a review, see Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). For
example, it has been demonstrated that the perceived fairness of
procedures exert stronger effects on people’s reactions when peo-
ple are uncertain whether an authority can be trusted than when
they are certain that the authority can or cannot be trusted (see Van
den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998). Furthermore, it has been shown
that ratings of outcome fairness are affected more strongly by
perceived procedural justice if people are uncertain whether the
outcome they have received is fair or unfair than when they are
certain about outcome fairness (Van den Bos et al., 1997). On the
basis of this line of work, it can be expected that participants in the
not-yet-known conditions will show stronger reactions to voice as
opposed to no-voice procedures than in the conditions in which it
is already known whether one has been included or excluded.
Experiment 1
In the first experiment, we tested our hypotheses by means of a
scenario experiment. In the scenario experiment, participants were
asked to imagine that they were members of a group. Participants
were further told that, because of external causes, 1 of the group
members had to leave the group. To determine who had to be
excluded, 2 members were nominated for exclusion by means of a
lottery. The other members would choose which of these 2 mem-
bers would have to leave the group. Participants in all conditions
were nominated for exclusion. We then varied whether the partic-
ipant was subsequently included by his or her peers, whether the
participant was excluded by his or her peers, or whether the
election was not yet held. Furthermore, we manipulated procedure
by varying whether the experimenter did or did not allow partic-
ipants an opportunity to voice their opinions about a decision that
was unrelated to the group-belongingness manipulation.
Several authors have argued that it is important to measure
people’s ratings of satisfaction following experiences of proce-
dural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den
Bos & Miedema, 2000; Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001;
Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). Furthermore, previous
studies have shown that measures of satisfaction are often highly
sensitive to procedural justice manipulations in experimental set-
tings, and satisfaction ratings therefore are very common depen-
dent variables in procedural justice experiments (see, e.g., Van den
Bos & Miedema, 2000; Van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, & Ybema,
2003; Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001; Van den Bos, Wilke, &
Lind, 1998; Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998; Van
Prooijen et al., 2002). To link up with this previous research, we
used participants’ ratings of procedural satisfaction as main de-
pendent measures.
Method
Participants and design. We tested our hypotheses in a 3 (group
belongingness: inclusion vs. exclusion vs. not yet known)  2 (procedure:
voice vs. no voice) design. Participants were 142 students at Leiden
University (Leiden, the Netherlands; 31 men, 111 women) varying in age
from 18 to 39 years. Participants voluntarily participated in the experiment
after participating in other, unrelated experiments. Participants received 10
Dutch guilders for each hour that they participated in the experiments (1
Dutch guilder equaled U.S. $0.50 at the time the studies reported in this
article were conducted).
Experimental procedure. On arrival at the laboratory, participants
were led to separate cubicles. In the cubicles, participants found computer
equipment on which we presented the stimulus information. Participants
were asked to imagine the following situation:
You are a member of a project group in a students’ union. In the past,
you have displayed a great effort for the students’ union. You are
therefore entitled to a once-only financial bonus of the executive
committee. Your project group has a total of eight members. How-
ever, because of a new law it is necessary to decrease the number of
members in your project group to seven members. In other words, one
member has to leave the project group. Within the project group, there
is some disagreement whether that person should be drawn by lots or
chosen by means of a poll. Therefore a procedure is adopted in which
both a lottery and a poll are held to exclude a member from the project
group: First, two persons are drawn by lots. These two persons are
nominated to be excluded from the project group. The other six
members will subsequently choose who of these two nominated
persons does or does not have to leave the project group.
This was followed by the manipulation of group belongingness. Partici-
pants read the following sentences:
After lots are drawn, it turns out that you are nominated for exclusion.
Either you or another member will have to leave the project group.
Following the poll you are included in the project group/Following
the poll you are excluded from the project group/The results of the
poll are not yet known and it will therefore be unclear for a while
whether you are included in or excluded from the project group.
After the manipulation of group belongingness we induced the manipula-
tion of procedure:
As noted before, for the work you have done in the past for the
students’ union you are entitled to a once-only financial bonus from
the executive committee. The executive committee gives you voice /
no-voice about the magnitude of this financial bonus.
After this, participants responded to the questions that constituted the
dependent variables. Specifically, participants answered the following two
items (cf. Van den Bos et al., 2001): “How satisfied are you with the way
you were treated?” (1  very unsatisfied, 7  very satisfied) and “How
happy are you with the way you were treated?” (1  not very happy, 7 
very happy). These two items were highly correlated (r  .95, p  .01),
and we averaged them to form a procedural satisfaction scale (  .98).
Results
When included as an independent variable in the analyses,
gender of the participants did not show a main effect or interaction
effects with the other independent variables on procedural satis-
faction ratings. We therefore dropped gender as an independent
variable in the statistical analyses reported here.
A 3  2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the procedural
satisfaction scale showed main effects of both procedure, F(1,
136)  94.28, p  .01, 2  .41, and group belongingness, F(2,
136)  3.70, p  .03, 2  .05. More important for the current
line of reasoning was that this analysis also yielded the predicted
interaction effect, F(2, 136)  3.46, p  .04, 2  .05. The cell
means and standard deviations are described in Table 1. To more
directly test our hypothesis, we contrasted the effect of procedure
in the inclusion condition with the effect of procedure in the
exclusion condition. We thus performed an interaction contrast
analysis to further establish whether the effect of procedure was
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significantly stronger in the inclusion condition than in the exclu-
sion condition. As expected, results showed a significant interac-
tion contrast effect, F(1, 136)  5.90, p  .02, 2  .04. In
correspondence with Hypothesis 1, the effect of procedure was
stronger in the inclusion condition than in the exclusion condition:
Participants’ ratings of procedural satisfaction were indeed af-
fected more strongly by voice as opposed to no-voice procedures
when they were included in a group, F(1, 136)  49.41, p  .01;
2  .27, than when they were excluded from a group, F(1,
136)  12.35, p  .01; 2  .08.
In the not-yet-known condition, we also found a significant
procedure simple main effect, F(1, 136)  40.12, p  .01; 2 
.23. This effect size was somewhat bigger than the procedure
effect size in the exclusion condition and was approximately equal
to the procedure effect size in the inclusion condition. Further-
more, it can be noted here that simple main effects showed that the
group-belongingness manipulation predominantly influenced the
procedural satisfaction ratings of participants who had received a
voice procedure, F(2, 136)  7.29, p  .01; 2  .10, and not of
those who had received a no-voice procedure, F  1. We come
back to this issue in the General Discussion.
Discussion
Findings of Experiment 1 showed that inclusion in a group leads
to stronger effects of voice as opposed to no-voice procedures on
participants’ ratings of procedural satisfaction than exclusion from
a group. The findings are supportive for our main hypothesis and
suggest that procedural fairness is relatively more impactful in
situations in which people are included in a group by their peers
than in situations in which they are excluded from a group by their
peers.
The findings did not support the fairness heuristic and uncer-
tainty management models’ prediction that procedural satisfaction
ratings would be particularly strongly affected by voice as opposed
to no-voice procedures when it was not yet known whether the
participant was included or excluded. The results showed a strong
procedure effect on participants’ procedural satisfaction ratings in
the not-yet-known condition, but this effect was not stronger than
in the inclusion condition. Although not entirely conclusive, the
findings in the not-yet-known condition are relatively more con-
sistent with the perspective that participants in the not-yet-known
condition may to some extent perceive themselves as included,
leading to a procedure effect that is somewhat stronger than the
procedure effect in the exclusion condition (in fact, the difference
between the not-yet-known and exclusion conditions was even
significant in Experiment 1; see Table 1).
Before drawing any strong conclusions about the results of
Experiment 1, it is important to replicate them. After all, in
Experiment 1 participants responded to variations in group belong-
ingness and procedural justice in a hypothetical situation. On the
basis of these findings, we do not know how people would respond
if they directly experienced variations in group belongingness and
voice procedures. We therefore tested our hypotheses again in a
second experiment in which participants directly experienced vari-
ations in group belongingness and procedure.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we investigated our hypotheses by using a
laboratory group membership. Some of the most crucial group
membership studies in the procedural justice domain have used
existing group memberships, such as university affiliations (e.g.,
Smith et al., 1998; Ståhl et al., 2004), organizations (e.g., Huo et
al., 1996), or cultural groups (Tyler et al., 1998). The use of a
laboratory group would therefore be worthwhile to extend these
previous studies by assessing whether group membership effects in
procedural justice may also be found in laboratory group situa-
tions. Furthermore, in the current research a laboratory group
paradigm makes it possible to get a sense of the robustness of our
findings. After all, replication in a situation that is substantially
different from the paradigm in Experiment 1 suggests that the
findings are not specific for the group setting of Experiment 1 but
may generalize to other group contexts. Furthermore, laboratory
group paradigms constitute controlled methods to experimentally
study group-belongingness effects, as such groups allow research-
ers to rule out many natural within-group differences (Brewer,
1979).
Participants were placed in a laboratory group called the blue
team (cf. Van Leeuwen, Van Knippenberg, & Ellemers, 2003). All
participants conducted individual tasks in this group. Participants
were told that, to make the size of the group comparable to other
groups, 1 member of the group had to be excluded. This member
would still conduct the individual tasks but would no longer be a
member of the blue team. In correspondence with Experiment 1, 2
participants were drawn by chance. In all conditions, the partici-
pant was nominated for exclusion from the blue team, and we
varied whether the participant was included in or excluded from
the blue team by their peers. Additionally, we induced a condition
in which it was not yet known whether the participant would be
included or excluded. Following this group-belongingness manip-
ulation, participants did versus did not get an opportunity to voice
an opinion in a decision-making process. To make the procedure
manipulation orthogonal to the group-belongingness manipulation,
participants did versus did not receive an opportunity to voice an
opinion about a decision that was unrelated to the group-
belongingness manipulation.
In correspondence with Experiment 1, we wanted to have an
indication of participants’ procedural satisfaction ratings. We
therefore measured the extent to which participants were satisfied
with the procedure. We also wanted to establish whether our
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Procedural
Satisfaction Ratings as a Function of Group Belongingness and
Procedure, Experiment 1
Procedure
Group belongingness
Inclusion Exclusion Not yet known
M SD M SD M SD
Voice 4.86a 1.82 3.31b 1.83 4.46a 1.95
No voice 1.89c 1.14 1.81c 0.84 1.69c 0.83
Note. Means are on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating more
positive ratings of procedural satisfaction. Means with no subscript in
common differ as indicated by a least significant difference test for mul-
tiple comparisons between means ( p  .05).
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findings would generalize to measures that are typically assessed
in procedural justice research: participants’ procedural justice
judgments. We therefore also asked participants how fair, just, and
appropriate they considered the decision-making procedure to be
(Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; cf. Van den Bos & Van
Prooijen, 2001).
Method
Participants and design. We again tested our hypothesis in a 3 (group
belongingness: inclusion vs. exclusion vs. not yet known)  2 (procedure:
voice vs. no-voice) factorial design. A total of 124 students at Leiden
University (47 men, 77 women), varying in age from 17 to 53 years,
voluntarily participated in the experiment. The experiment was preceded
and followed by other, unrelated experiments. Participants were paid 10
Dutch guilders for each hour that they participated in the experiments.
Procedure. On arrival at the laboratory, participants were led to one of
eight separate cubicles. In each cubicle, participants found computer equip-
ment from which they read and responded to the stimulus information. The
experiment was presented as a study on how people perform tasks in
groups. Furthermore, we suggested the presence of 7 other participants,
who were all in one of the other seven cubicles. Participants were informed
that all 8 participants that were present in the laboratory would perform
tasks in a group. This group was referred to as the blue team for the rest of
the experiment, and the group was assigned a blue team logo that appeared
on the computer screen (cf. Van Leeuwen et al., 2003). Every member
received an individual identification letter ranging from A to H (in reality,
all participants were told they were Member C), and we suggested that, by
means of the computer network, the experimenter could send messages to
all members of the blue team during the course of the experiment. (In
reality, all stimulus information was preprogrammed, an experimental
procedure none of the participants objected to on debriefing.)
After this, the experimental procedure was outlined to the participants.
The blue team would perform tasks in one practice round of 2 min and two
work rounds, all rounds taking up 5 min. The team score on the task would
be computed by adding the individual scores of the individual group
members. Of special importance was the team score on the second work
round: This team score would be compared with the scores on the second
work round of other teams, which either had previously participated in the
experiment or would participate later in the experiment. Furthermore, in
the second work round all participants would be assigned a minimum
number of tasks that a participant had to complete individually within the
5 min. To enhance comprehension of the experimental procedure, we
posed five practice questions. If participants gave a wrong answer to a
question, the correct answer was disclosed, and the main characteristics of
the experimental procedure were repeated.
After this, the tasks were explained to the participants. Figures would be
presented on the upper right side of the monitor. Each figure consisted of
36 squares, and each square showed one of eight distinctive patterns. One
of these patterns was presented at the upper left side of the computer
screen, and participants had to count the number of squares with this
pattern in the figure at the right side of the monitor. After the participants
had indicated the correct number, a new square was presented. This
procedure was repeated for 2 min in the practice round and for 5 min in the
first work round. In each round, the time remaining was presented at the
lower left side of the monitor and the number of tasks completed (i.e., the
number of figures the participants had counted during the round) was
presented at the lower right side of the monitor. At the end of the first work
round, all participants were informed that all members of the blue team had
completed a comparable number of tasks. Furthermore, we asked partici-
pants the following question: “How good are your fellow group members
in conducting the tasks compared to how good you are?” (1 much worse,
7  much better).
After the first work round had ended, participants were informed that
previous teams all consisted of 7 members. Because the blue team con-
sisted of 8 members and the team score on the second work round had to
be comparable to the team scores of other teams, 1 of the members had to
be excluded from the blue team. The excluded participant would still finish
the study and perform the second work round. Furthermore, the excluded
person would (in correspondence with the participants who were not
excluded from the blue team) also be assigned an individual minimum
number of tasks to be completed in the second work round. However, the
excluded person would no longer be a member of the blue team and his or
her individual score on the second work round would not count for the
team score.
Next, we explained to participants how 1 of the members would be
excluded from the blue team: The computer would draw 2 members by
chance. These 2 members would be nominated for exclusion. After this, an
election would be held: The other 6 members of the blue team would all
choose 1 of the nominated members by means of the computer network.
The nominated member that was chosen by most other team members
would be excluded from the blue team. To ensure comprehension of this
part of the experimental procedure, we then posed several dichotomous
questions, of which the following is most relevant for the current purposes:
“Should the person who is excluded finish the study and the second work
round alone, and not as a member of the blue team?” (1  yes, 2  no).
After this, the manipulation of group belongingness took place. All
participants were drawn by the computer and thus nominated for exclusion.
In the inclusion condition, the election was held and the participant was
informed that he or she was not chosen and therefore included in the blue
team. In the exclusion condition, the election was held and the participant
was informed that he or she was chosen and therefore excluded from the
blue team.1 In the not-yet-known condition, participants were informed
that the election was not yet held and would be held later on in the study.
The manipulation of procedure was then administered to the participants.
In the voice condition, participants were informed that they were allowed
an opportunity to voice an opinion about the individual number of tasks
they had to complete in the second work round (cf. Lind et al., 1990).
These participants were asked to type in their opinions about the minimum
number of tasks they had to complete within 5 min. In the no-voice
condition, participants were informed that they were not allowed an op-
portunity to voice their opinions about the individual number of tasks they
had to complete in the second work round. These participants were not
asked to type in their opinion about the number of tasks they had to
complete within 5 min.
Participants were then asked to answer the questions that constituted the
dependent variables and the manipulation checks. Our main dependent
measures consisted of the following three procedural justice judgments (cf.
Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001): “How fair was the procedure used to
determine the number of tasks you had to complete in the second work
round?” (1 very unfair, 7 very fair), “How just was the procedure used
to determine the number of tasks you had to complete in the second work
round?” (1  very unjust, 7  very just), and “How appropriate was the
procedure used to determine the number of tasks you had to complete in the
second work round?” (1  very inappropriate, 7  very appropriate).
These three items were averaged into a reliable procedural justice scale
(  .95). Furthermore, to assess participants’ satisfaction with the pro-
cedure, we asked the following question: “How satisfied are you with the
1 We made sure not to provide participants with explicit reasons why the
other participants did or did not choose them to be excluded from the blue
team. Providing participants with explicit reasons why they were included
or excluded by their peers would confound the group-belongingness ma-
nipulation with justifications, which is another procedural justice opera-
tionalization, different from the voice concept we are trying to focus on
here (e.g., Folger & Martin, 1986; Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983).
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procedure used to determine the number of tasks you had to complete in the
second work round?” (1  very unsatisfied, 7  very satisfied).
As a first check on the group-belongingness manipulation, we asked
participants to what extent they agreed with the following statements (1 
totally disagree, 7  totally agree): “I could remain a member of the blue
team,” “I could not remain a member of the blue team” (recoded), “After
I was nominated by the computer, my fellow team members chose me for
exclusion from the blue team,” and “After I was nominated by the com-
puter, my fellow team members did not choose me for exclusion from the
blue team” (recoded). These four items were averaged into a group-
belongingness check scale (  .82).
Furthermore, to check the not-yet-known conditions, we asked partici-
pants to what extent they agreed with the following statements (1  totally
disagree, 7  totally agree): “It was not yet known whether I could stay
a member of the blue team,” and “After I was nominated by the computer
the election was not yet held.” These two items were highly correlated (r
.58, p  .01), and we averaged them into a not-yet-known scale (  .74).
Finally, to check the procedure manipulation, we asked participants the
following two questions (1  not at all, 7  very much): “To what extent
could you voice an opinion about the number of tasks you had to complete
in the second work round?” and “To what extent did the experimenter pay
attention to your opinion about the number of tasks you had to complete in
the second work round?” These two items were highly correlated (r  .80,
p  .01), and we averaged them into a procedure check scale (  .87).
Additionally, we posed the following question: “Do you think that other
participants were allowed to voice their opinions?” (1  certainly not, 7 
certainly). After this, participants were informed that the experiment had
ended. Participants were fully debriefed, thanked, and paid for their
participation.
Results
When included as an independent variable in a multivariate
analysis of variance (MANOVA) on procedural justice judgments
and procedural satisfaction ratings, gender of the participants
yielded a significant three-way interaction with procedure and
group belongingness at the multivariate level, F(2, 112)  4.04,
p  .03; 2  .07. However, this three-way interaction was
nonsignificant at the univariate level for both procedural justice
judgments, F(2, 112)  2.21, p  .11, and procedural satisfaction
ratings, F  1. Furthermore, gender did not show any other
significant main effects or interactions with the other independent
variables on the manipulation checks and dependent variables
reported later. We therefore dropped gender in the statistical anal-
yses reported.
Manipulation checks. We checked the experimental manipu-
lations with 3  2 ANOVAs. On the group-belongingness check
scale, we found a main effect of group belongingness only, F(2,
118)  311.07, p  .01; 2  .84. As indicated by a least
significant difference (LSD) test for multiple comparisons between
means, with the group-belongingness manipulation as the indepen-
dent variable, participants in the exclusion condition perceived
themselves to be significantly less included in the blue team (M 
1.99, SD 1.12) than participants in the inclusion condition (M
6.63, SD  .74; p  .01). Furthermore, the mean of the not-yet-
known condition (M  4.12, SD  .52) was lower than the mean
in the inclusion condition ( p  .01) and higher than the mean in
the exclusion condition ( p  .01). To summarize, participants in
the inclusion conditions perceived themselves to be relatively
more included in the blue team than participants in the not-yet-
known and the exclusion conditions, and participants in the not-
yet-known conditions perceived themselves to be relatively more
included in the blue team than participants in the exclusion con-
ditions. These data thereby show that participants perceived the
group-belongingness manipulation as intended and that the group-
belongingness manipulation was successful in inducing the levels
of inclusion that were intended with this manipulation.
On the not-yet-known scale, we found a significant main effect
of group belongingness only, F(2, 118)  97.73, p  .01; 2 
.62. As indicated by an LSD test with the group-belongingness
manipulation as the independent variable, participants in the not-
yet-known conditions agreed more strongly with the statements
that it was unknown whether they would be excluded (M  6.36,
SD  1.32) than participants in the exclusion (M  2.27, SD 
1.68) or inclusion conditions (M  2.35, SD  1.55; ps  .01).
Participants in the inclusion and exclusion conditions did not differ
significantly in their reactions to these statements.
Finally, results on the procedure check scale showed a main
effect of procedure only, F(1, 118)  694.15, p  .01; 2  .86.
Participants in the voice condition perceived more opportunities to
voice their opinions (M 5.46, SD 1.27) than participants in the
no-voice condition (M 1.07, SD .40). From these analyses, we
can conclude that participants perceived the experimental manip-
ulations as intended.
Comparability judgments. A 2  3 ANOVA on the question
of how good participants’ fellow group members were in conduct-
ing the tasks compared with how good the participant was yielded
no significant effects (overall M 3.98; SD 0.28). Furthermore,
the overall mean did not differ significantly from the scale mean.
This shows that participants in all conditions rated the task per-
formance of their fellow team members to be comparable to their
own task performance.
Consequences of exclusion answers. On the dichotomous
question of whether the excluded person should finish the study
and the second work round alone, and not as a member of the blue
team, all 124 participants identified the correct answer (yes). This
shows that all participants realized that being excluded implied
that they should finish the study in isolation from the blue team
and not as a group member.
Voiced opinions. We then conducted an ANOVA with the
group-belongingness manipulation as independent variable on the
opinions that participants in the voice condition expressed about
the number of tasks they had to complete. This analysis showed no
significant effect of group belongingness, F  1 (overall M 
56.77; SD  2.70). This demonstrates that participants in the three
group-belongingness conditions did not differ in their voiced opin-
ions, as they indicated the same minimum number of tasks to
complete in the second work round.
Other participants’ opinions. We found a significant proce-
dure main effect on the question of whether other participants were
allowed to voice their opinions, F(1, 118)  41.72, p  .01; 2 
.26. Participants in the voice condition were more convinced that
other participants could voice their opinions (M  5.68, SD 
1.59) than participants in the no-voice condition (M  3.71, SD 
1.82). Importantly, both the group belongingness main effect and
the interaction were nonsignificant (Fs  1). This shows that
participants’ own level of inclusion did not affect participants’
perceptions of whether other participants were allowed voice,
suggesting that participants did not attribute their level of voice to
their level of inclusion in the blue team.
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Dependent measures. The cell means and standard deviations
of participants’ procedural justice judgments and procedural sat-
isfaction ratings are depicted in Table 2. We first analyzed the
dependent variables at the multivariate level. A 3  2 MANOVA
yielded a multivariate main effect of procedure, F(2, 117) 
768.68, p  .01; 2  .93. More important, this analysis also
yielded the predicted multivariate interaction effect, F(2, 118) 
4.34, p  .02; 2  .07.
We then proceeded to test the univariate effects. On the proce-
dural justice judgments, we found both a procedure main effect,
F(1, 118)  127.24, p  .01; 2  .52, and the predicted
interaction effect, F(2, 118)  3.43, p  .04; 2  .06. To more
directly test our hypothesis, we contrasted the effect of procedure
in the inclusion condition with the effect of procedure in the
exclusion condition. In correspondence with Experiment 1, the
results showed a significant interaction contrast effect, F(1, 118)
6.52, p  .02; 2  .05. As predicted, participants’ procedural
justice judgments were affected more strongly by voice as opposed
to no-voice procedures in the inclusion condition, F(1, 118) 
64.l3, p  .01; 2  .35, than in the exclusion condition, F(1,
118)  20.29, p  .01; 2  .15.
It can further be noted here that we found a significant proce-
dure simple main effect on participants’ procedural justice judg-
ments in the not-yet-known condition, F(1, 118) 50.59, p .01;
2  .30. Furthermore, it can be noted here that the group-
belongingness manipulation did not affect procedural justice judg-
ments if participants had experienced a voice procedure, F  1,
but it did if participants had experienced a no-voice procedure,
F(2, 118)  3.45, p  .04; 2  .06.
The univariate analyses on participants’ procedural satisfaction
ratings also yielded a significant univariate procedure main effect,
F(1, 118)  97.76, p  .01; 2  .45, and a significant univariate
interaction effect, F(2, 118)  3.96, p  .03; 2  .06. The
contrast of the procedure effect in the inclusion condition versus
the procedure effect in the exclusion condition turned out to be
significant, F(1, 118)  7.63, p  .01; 2  .06. As predicted,
voice as opposed to no-voice procedures exerted stronger effects
on people’s procedural satisfaction ratings in the inclusion condi-
tion, F(1, 118)  54.72, p  .01; 2  .32, than in the exclusion
condition, F(1, 118)  12.28, p  .01; 2  .09. These results
revealed corroborative evidence for our hypothesis on both proce-
dural justice judgments and procedural satisfaction ratings.
In the not-yet-known condition, we found a significant proce-
dure simple main effect on participants’ procedural satisfaction
ratings, F(1, 118)  39.10, p  .01; 2  .25. Furthermore, we
note that the group-belongingness manipulation affected partici-
pants’ procedural satisfaction ratings when they had experienced
an opportunity to voice their opinions, F(2, 118)  3.40, p  .04;
2  .05, but not when they had not experienced such an oppor-
tunity, F(2, 118)  1.70, ns. We return to this latter finding in the
General Discussion.
Discussion
Both Experiments 1 and 2 corroborate our hypothesis that
people’s reactions to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures are
affected more strongly when they are included in a group than
when they are excluded from a group. We argue that these findings
fill a missing link in social psychologists’ understanding of the
relation between group membership and procedural justice. That
is, these findings reveal that social inclusion and exclusion by
peers work in association with procedural justice to determine
social reactions. Building on previous research on group member-
ship and procedural justice (e.g., Huo et al., 1996; Smith et al.,
1998; Ståhl et al., 2004; Tyler et al., 1998), the relational model
(Tyler & Lind, 1992), the group-belongingness literature
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and theories on moral exclusion
(Deutsch, 1974; Opotow, 1990; cf. Huo, 1997), the findings pre-
sented here indicate that procedural fairness affects people’s reac-
tions more strongly when they are included in than when they are
excluded from social groups by their peers. Experiment 1 found
evidence for our prediction using clear-cut descriptions of social
situations. Experiment 2 made evident that these findings may
generalize to situations in which participants directly experience
variations in group belongingness and voice procedures.
In correspondence with Experiment 1, the results in the not-yet-
known condition again do not support fairness heuristic and un-
certainty management model’s predictions that people’s reactions
to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures are enhanced when
people do not know whether they will be excluded. That is, the
effect sizes in the not-yet-known condition on both procedural
justice judgments and satisfaction ratings were somewhat bigger
than the procedure effect sizes in the exclusion condition and were
approximately equal to the procedure effect sizes in the inclusion
condition (see Table 2). Although not entirely conclusive, these
findings converge relatively more with the position that partici-
pants in the not-yet-known condition still belong to the blue team
and thus perceive themselves as to some extent included (see the
manipulation check findings), leading to a moderately strong pro-
cedure effect when compared with the inclusion and exclusion
conditions.
Previous theorizing has tried to explain the relation between
group membership and procedural justice by positing that fair
procedures convey symbolic messages of inclusion in a specific
and identifiable group (e.g., Huo et al., 1996; Lind & Tyler, 1988;
Smith et al., 1998; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Contrary to what was
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Procedural
Justice Judgments and Procedural Satisfaction Ratings as a
Function of Group Belongingness and Procedure, Experiment 2
Dependent variable
Group belongingness
Inclusion Exclusion Not yet known
M SD M SD M SD
Procedural justice
judgments
Voice 5.62a 1.06 5.05a 1.09 5.33a 1.05
No voice 2.57c 1.41 3.39b 1.47 2.73b,c 1.18
Procedural satisfaction
ratings
Voice 5.90a 1.07 4.73b 1.16 5.25a,b 1.16
No voice 2.80c 1.51 3.26c 1.48 2.74c 1.48
Note. Means are on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating more
positive ratings on the dependent variable in question. Means with no
subscript in common differ as indicated by a least significant difference test
for multiple comparisons between means ( p  .05).
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assumed before by this theorizing, in the current article, we argue
that procedural justice may affirm people’s level of belongingness
and is therefore a social norm that is more relevant to people who
experience high levels of belongingness. This proposition may
imply that the relation between group belongingness and proce-
dural justice has to do with a concern for a general sense of
belongingness and not necessarily belongingness to a specific and
identifiable group. Some first indication for this can be inferred
from Experiment 2. More specifically, the findings obtained in
Experiment 2 showed that the effects of voice as opposed to
no-voice procedures were stronger following inclusion by peers
than following exclusion by peers, even though the authority was
not a member of the participant’s group and the procedure had no
direct relation with participants’ group membership. This may
suggest that the relation between group memberships and proce-
dural justice may not necessarily be group specific but rather may
have to do with a more fundamental human sense of whether
belongingness needs are met (cf. Baumeister & Leary, 1995). To
obtain more direct evidence for this proposition, we conducted a
third experiment. This third experiment may additionally increase
our confidence that people’s level of inclusion was indeed the
underlying construct that can explain the findings of Experiments
1 and 2.
Experiment 3
In our third experiment, we tested the hypothesis that people
who generally experience high levels of inclusion by peers in their
lives show stronger reactions to voice as opposed to no-voice
procedures than people who generally experience low levels of
inclusion by peers in their lives. We therefore measured the extent
to which participants felt included by peers in their lives with a
10-item Belongingness in Life Scale (e.g., items such as “I am
typically someone who has a lot of friends”; see the Method
section for details). The assessment of this Belongingness in Life
Scale was presented as a first study (Study 1) that was unrelated to
subsequent studies. After this, participants started with Study 2, in
which they did versus did not receive an opportunity to voice their
opinions in a decision-making process. In correspondence with
Experiment 2, main dependent measures were participants’ proce-
dural justice judgments and satisfaction ratings.
Method
Participants and design. We tested our hypothesis in a design in which
we measured belongingness in life as a continuous independent variable
and manipulated procedure by randomly assigning participants to voice as
opposed to no-voice conditions. Participants were 100 students at the Free
University Amsterdam (41 men, 59 women) varying in age from 18 to 30
years. The experiment preceded other, unrelated studies. Participants vol-
untarily participated in the experiments and received 5 Euros for their
participation (1 Euro equaled U.S. $1 at the time this study was conducted).
Experimental procedure. On arrival at the laboratory, participants
were led to separate cubicles. In the cubicles, participants found computer
equipment on which we presented the stimulus information. The experi-
ment was introduced as two unrelated studies. Participants started with
Study 1, which was presented as a study about “life experiences.” The
study constituted a questionnaire with a total of 35 items measured on
7-point scales. In this questionnaire, 25 items were filler items and 10 items
measured the level of inclusion that participants experience in their lives.
We refer to this 10-item scale as the Belongingness in Life scale. Partic-
ipants rated the extent to which the following 10 statements were charac-
teristic for themselves (1  not at all, 7  very much): “I am typically
someone who has a lot of friends,” “There are only a few people that are
really important to me” (recoded), “I easily get in touch with new people,”
“I have the feeling that a lot of people accept me,” “I often am involved in
the plans of other people,” “There are a lot of people who care for me,” “I
often am alone” (recoded), “I often undertake things with other people,”
“There are a lot of people who know me,” and “There are a lot of people
that I can go to when I am in trouble.”2 These 10 items were averaged into
a reliable Belongingness in Life scale (  .84).
The first study then ended, and participants continued with Study 2. This
second study was presented as a study on “people’s perceptions of their
own future.” Participants were informed that they would do a writing
exercise that had to do with their future. Furthermore, participants were
told that, by means of the computer network, the experimenter could send
messages to the participants during the experiment. Additionally, partici-
pants were informed that a lottery would take place among all participants.
The winner of the lottery would receive a prize of 50 Euros. A total of 200
lottery tickets would therefore be divided among all participants, and some
of these lottery tickets would be allocated to the participant.
Participants then started with the writing exercise about their future.
Participants read a brief description of how their future may look in 20
years and were asked to imagine themselves in this possible future.3 After
this, participants were asked to write down what their thoughts and emo-
tions would be if this possible future would really turn out to be their future
in 20 years. Following this writing exercise, we induced the procedure
manipulation. In the voice condition, participants allegedly received a
message from the experimenter by means of the computer network that
they would be allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion about the
number of lottery tickets they thought they should receive. These partici-
pants subsequently typed in this number. In the no-voice condition, par-
ticipants allegedly received a message from the experimenter by means of
the computer network that they would not be allowed an opportunity to
voice their opinion about the number of lottery tickets they thought they
should receive. These participants did not type in this number. Following
this manipulation, participants read that at the end of the experiment they
would be informed how many lottery tickets they would receive.
Participants then responded to the questions that constituted the depen-
dent variables and the manipulation checks. To assess participants’ proce-
dural justice judgments, we asked the following two questions: “How fair
was the procedure used to divide the lottery tickets?” (1 very unfair, 7
very fair) and “How just was the procedure used to divide the lottery
tickets?” (1  very unjust, 7  very just). These two items were highly
correlated (r  .90, p  .01), and we averaged them into a reliable
procedural justice scale (  .95). To measure participants’ satisfaction
with the experimenter we asked the following two questions: “How satis-
fied are you with the experimenter in general?” (1  very unsatisfied, 7 
2 Four items in our Belongingness in Life Scale were inspired by, and
loosely based on, items in the Need to Belong Scale (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell,
& Schreiendorfer, 2001; we thank David de Cremer for providing us with
a Dutch translation of the Need to Belong Scale). However, these items
were modified in at least one important way: Whereas the Need to Belong
Scale asks for people’s need to be included in social groups, our Belong-
ingness in Life Scale assesses people’s perceptions of the extent to which
they actually are included by their peers in social groups.
3 The description of participants’ possible future contained an additional
manipulation: Participants imagined themselves in a future in which they
were either very successful or very unsuccessful. This manipulation did not
show any main or interaction effects on the manipulation check and
dependent variables reported below, nor did it alter any of the reported
findings. We therefore decided to drop this manipulation from further
analyses and discussions.
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very satisfied) and “How happy are you with the experimenter in general?”
(1  not very happy, 7  very happy). These two items were highly
correlated (r  .68, p  .01), and we averaged them into a reliable
satisfaction scale (  .81).
To check the procedure manipulation, we asked the following two
questions (1 not at all, 7 very much): “To what extent could you voice
an opinion about the division of the lottery tickets?” and “To what extent
did the experimenter pay attention to your opinion about the division of the
lottery tickets?” These two items were highly correlated (r .83, p .01),
and we averaged them into a reliable procedure check scale (  .90).
After this, participants were fully debriefed, thanked, and paid for their
participation.
Results
To analyze the data, we conducted hierarchical regression anal-
yses in which the main effect terms of belongingness in life and
procedure were specified in Step 1 and the interaction term in Step
2. Following Aiken and West’s (1991) recommendations, we
centered participants’ answers on the Belongingness in Life Scale
and dummy coded the procedure manipulation. The interaction
term was based on the product of the centered Belongingness in
Life Scale and the dummy-coded procedure manipulation.
When included as an independent variable in the hierarchical
regression analyses, gender of the participants did not show any
main effects or interactions with the other independent variables
on any of the manipulation checks or dependent variables reported
later. We therefore dropped gender in the statistical analyses
reported.
Manipulation check. A hierarchical regression analysis on the
procedure check scale showed that only Step 1 (in which we tested
for main effects) accounted for a significant amount of variance,
R2  .60; F(2, 96)  70.61, p  .01, and that Step 2 (testing for
the interaction effect) did not lead to significantly improved re-
gression results (F  1). Participants’ answers on the procedure
check scale were predicted by the procedure main effect only (
.77, p  .01). Participants in the voice condition perceived more
opportunities to voice their opinions (M  4.94, SD  1.48) than
participants in the no-voice condition (M  1.71, SD  1.23).
From these results, we conclude that our procedure manipulation
was induced successfully.
Voiced opinions. In the voice condition, participants’ voiced
opinions were uncorrelated with the Belongingness in Life Scale
(r  .12, p  .40; overall M  33.86, SD  61.47). In correspon-
dence with Experiment 2, participants’ level of belongingness was
unrelated to the opinions that they expressed.
Dependent variables. The results of the hierarchical regression
analyses on the dependent variables are displayed in Table 3. The
results showed that Step 1 accounted for a significant part of the
variance on procedural justice judgments, R2  .07; F(2, 96) 
4.07, p  .03, and on satisfaction with the experimenter, R2 
.18; F(2, 96)  11.14, p  .01. As shown in Table 3, participants’
answers on the dependent variables were predicted by significant
and positive effects of the procedure manipulation. More important
was that Step 2 accounted for a significant part of the variance
beyond the variance of the main effects on participants’ procedural
justice judgments, R2  .05; F(1, 96)  5.52, p  .03, and on
their satisfaction with the experimenter, R2  .04; F(1, 96) 
5.21, p  .03. As shown in Table 3, we found significant and
positive interaction terms on both our dependent measures. To
further explore these interaction terms, we conducted simple slope
analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). Among those high in belonging-
ness in life, voice as opposed to no-voice procedures positively
affected procedural justice judgments (  .41, p  .01) and
satisfaction ratings (  .55, p  .01), whereas among those low
in belongingness in life voice as opposed to no-voice procedures
had no significant effects on procedural justice judgments ( 
.09, p  .56) or satisfaction ratings (  .25, p  .10). The
interaction on procedural justice judgments in illustrated in Figure
1, and the interaction on satisfaction ratings is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. These results indicate that, as predicted, the procedure
manipulation had stronger effects on participants’ procedural jus-
tice judgments and satisfaction ratings if they experience higher
levels of belongingness in their lives.
As an aside, it can be noted here that the Belongingness in Life
Scale did not predict procedural justice judgments in the voice
condition (  .26, p  .07) or in the no-voice condition ( 
.22, p  .12). The Belongingness in Life Scale did predict
satisfaction ratings in the voice condition (  .33, p  .03) but
not in the no-voice condition (  .16, p  .26). We revisit this
issue in the General Discussion.
Discussion
Experiment 3 constitutes an extension of Experiments 1 and 2.
Whereas the first two studies manipulated inclusion versus exclu-
sion by peers in a group, the third study showed that people who
generally perceive themselves to be more included by peers in
their lives responded more strongly to voice as opposed to no-
voice procedures on procedural justice judgments and satisfaction
ratings. This finding corresponds with the general argument of the
current article that people’s level of inclusion moderates the effects
of voice as opposed to no-voice procedures, and it suggests that
people’s level of inclusion is the underlying construct that can
explain the findings of Experiments 1 and 2. Furthermore, the
findings of Experiment 3 indicate that the relation between group
membership and procedural justice is not necessarily explainable
because voice procedures affirm inclusion in a specific and iden-
tifiable group membership, but can also have to do with a more
general human sense of belongingness. After all, people’s general
level of inclusion by peers in their lives was measured in an
independent study prior to the procedure manipulation, and the
Table 3
Results From Hierarchical Regression Analyses: Procedural
Justice Judgments and Satisfaction Ratings as a Function of
Belongingness in Life and Procedure, Experiment 3
Regression step
Procedural justice
judgments
Satisfaction
ratings
 t(98) R2  t(98) R2
Step 1
Belongingness in life .03 0.31 .04 0.40
Procedure .27 2.84** .07* .42 4.70** .18**
Step 2
Belongingness in Life
 Procedure .24 2.35* .05* .22 2.28* .05*
Note. * p  .05. ** p  .01.
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Belongingness in Life Scale did not refer to a specific and iden-
tifiable group.
General Discussion
The current research integrates previous research findings on
group membership and procedural justice. That is, it has been
reported that authority’s categorization (Smith et al., 1998; Ståhl et
al., 2004), level of identification (Huo et al., 1996), and within
versus between group interactions (Tyler et al., 1998) affect peo-
ple’s reactions to procedural justice. We argue here that these three
different aspects of group membership share at least one common
feature: All these aspects of group membership may be indicative
of people’s level of inclusiveness with others. Furthermore, in all
these studies, the strongest procedural justice effects were found
under conditions of high inclusiveness (i.e., in-group authorities,
high identification, within-group interactions). This suggests that
high levels of inclusion lead to strong reactions to procedures. This
position was corroborated by the current research, in which direct
inclusion by peers in Experiments 1 and 2 led to relatively stronger
reactions to procedures than direct exclusion by peers. Further-
more, in Experiment 3 it was shown that people who generally
experience high levels of inclusion in their lives respond more
strongly to procedures than people who experience low levels of
inclusion in their lives. These are findings that fit into the group-
belongingness literature, given that being included by peers is
beneficial to people’s belongingness needs (cf. Baumeister &
Leary, 1995), and fairness is associated with this sense of belong-
ingness because fairness may affirm people’s inclusion in groups
(Lind & Tyler, 1988). Fairness may therefore help people to
maintain a satisfactory feeling of inclusion in social groups. From
all this, we conclude that one of the reasons why fairness may be
important to people is that it can have utility as an inclusion
maintenance tool.
It is important to note here that the central role of group
membership in the present article should not be taken as evidence
that group membership is a necessary precondition for procedural
justice effects to occur (for similar arguments, see Folger, 1998).
After all, variations in procedural justice also tend to exert strong
effects on people’s reactions when no particular group member-
ship is salient (see, e.g., Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos &
Miedema, 2000; Van Prooijen et al., 2002). These considerations
suggest that procedural justice may affect people’s reactions both
in group-related and in group-unrelated situations. In correspon-
dence with this, in Experiments 1 and 2 we found strong effects of
voice versus no-voice procedures even if participants were ex-
cluded by their peers and, thus, were no longer members of the
group. This may imply that the association between fairness and
people’s level of inclusion may be an important reason but not the
sole reason why people care about fairness. This distinction be-
tween sufficient and necessary causes of justice effects (see Folger
& Cropanzano, 1998) is an important yet often overlooked feature
of the social justice literature. Indeed, future researchers might
productively investigate this fundamental difference in the justice
judgment process. This said, however, what we think the findings
here have consistently shown is that people’s level of inclusion is
a moderator of procedural fairness effects.
Both the moral exclusion literature and the current experiments
have examined the relationship between fairness and social inclu-
sion and exclusion. However, whereas the moral exclusion litera-
ture concentrates on determinants of fair or unfair behaviors as a
function of social inclusion and exclusion (Deutsch, 1974; Huo,
1997; Opotow, 1990), we have focused on people’s reactions to
fairness or unfairness as a function of social inclusion and exclu-
sion. The current experiments are thereby substantially different
from the moral exclusion literature. Yet, we urge researchers to
note here that empirical research data on moral exclusion are rather
scarce. This is unfortunate, because the psychology of moral
exclusion may be very important to understanding the dark side of
human behavior (cf. Opotow, 1990), making empirical research in
this direction highly worthwhile. Even more generally, empirical
procedural justice research has predominantly focused on people’s
reactions to fairness and not on what may lead people to behave
fairly or unfairly (cf. Greenberg, 1987; Folger, 1998). Understand-
ing the determinants of fair or unfair behaviors seems to be a
critical topic and may be an important direction for future justice
research.
A strength of the current experiments is that the reported effects
were found in situations in which participants received voice about
something that was not related to their group membership or to
their belongingness in life. Authorities either did or did not allow
participants voice about a financial bonus in Experiment 1, about
the number of tasks to be completed in Experiment 2, and about a
number of lottery tickets in Experiment 3. Furthermore, the au-
thorities in Experiments 1 and 2 were not directly a member of
participants’ group. We did this to ensure that the group-
belongingness manipulation was fully orthogonal to the procedure
Figure 1. Procedural justice judgments as a function of belongingness in
life and procedure.
Figure 2. Satisfaction with the experimenter as a function of belonging-
ness in life and procedure.
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manipulation and that the induction of the procedure manipulation
was not perceived differently across group-belongingness condi-
tions. Manipulation check findings corroborated this, leading us to
conclude that the procedure manipulation was not confounded
with the belongingness manipulation. Moreover, in Experiment 3
we measured belongingness in life in an independent study that
preceded the study that included the procedure manipulation. It can
therefore be concluded that level of inclusion affects people’s
reactions to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures, even if
participants receive voice or no voice from an independent author-
ity about a decision that is unrelated to one’s particular group
membership.
To get an indication of the robustness of our findings, we have
used three different methodologies to investigate the moderating
effects of group belongingness on reactions to procedures. That is,
in Experiment 1 we used a scenario experiment, whereas in Ex-
periment 2 we investigated our hypotheses using laboratory
groups. These experiments were extended with Experiment 3, in
which we measured participants’ level of inclusion as an individ-
ual difference variable. Additionally, in all three experiments we
investigated our hypotheses on satisfaction judgments, and in
Experiments 2 and 3 we also investigated whether the expected
effects could be found on procedural justice judgments as well.
Converging evidence across the experiments suggests that the
current findings are not specific to one single methodology, but
rather they represent phenomena that are robust and can be dem-
onstrated in different research set ups and several social situations.
The predicted effects were found on both satisfaction ratings
(Experiments 1–3) and on procedural justice judgments (Experi-
ments 2 and 3). However, the results show that the group-
belongingness manipulation predominantly affected participants’
ratings of procedural satisfaction following voice procedures (see
Tables 1 and 2), whereas the group-belongingness manipulation
predominantly affected participants’ procedural justice judgments
following no-voice procedures in Experiment 2 (see Table 2).
Furthermore, the Belongingness in Life Scale in Experiment 3
predicted satisfaction ratings following voice procedures but did
not predict procedural justice judgments following voice or no-
voice procedures. Research has shown that, sometimes, different
processes may operate in justice judgments and satisfaction ratings
(e.g., Van den Bos et al., 1997; Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, &
Vermunt, 1998). Future researchers may want to find out which
dependent variable is particularly sensitive to voice or to no-voice
procedures. For the present research, we note that group belong-
ingness has the potential to affect people’s reactions following
both voice and no-voice procedures.
Additionally, it should be noted here that satisfaction judgments
had a strong overall correlation with procedural justice judgments
in Experiment 2 (r  .85, p  .01), that in this experiment these
two measures were strongly correlated within all six conditions of
the design (r  .55  r  .87, ps  .02), and that these within-
condition correlations did not differ significantly from each other
as shown by Fisher’s r to z transformations with Bonferroni
correction. Furthermore, in Experiment 3 procedural justice judg-
ments also correlated strongly with satisfaction ratings (r  .47,
p  .01). This shows that procedural justice judgments were
substantially associated with satisfaction judgments in both Exper-
iments 2 and 3, and it suggests that when studying the interplay of
group belongingness and procedural justice it may be more appro-
priate to focus on the convergence rather than on the divergence of
the two measures (for related arguments, see Brockner & Wiesen-
feld, 1996; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Furthermore, in
Experiment 2 the two measures converged on the predicted finding
that the effects of voice as opposed to no-voice procedures on
people’s reactions were stronger if participants were included in a
group than if they were excluded from a group—a finding that was
corroborated by the finding in Experiment 3 that the effects of
procedure on both procedural justice judgments and satisfaction
ratings are stronger among those who experience high levels of
belongingness in their lives than among those who experience low
levels of belongingness in their lives.
We could not find corroborative evidence for the tentative
prediction in Experiments 1 and 2 that the effects of procedure
would be relatively stronger in the not-yet-known conditions than
in the inclusion and the exclusion conditions. This prediction was
based on recently developed social–cognitive models of proce-
dural justice, notably fairness heuristic theory and the uncertainty
management model (Lind et al., 1993; Van den Bos et al., 1997;
Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos et al., 2001; Van den Bos &
Lind, 2002). An explanation may be found in the fact that the
current research was conducted in an explicit social (i.e., intra-
group) setting. Such a group dynamic context is distinct from the
cognitive setting of previous studies on fairness heuristic and
uncertainty management frameworks. Furthermore, other research
that failed to support predictions from fairness heuristic theory and
the uncertainty management model was conducted in social set-
tings as well (Van den Bos & Lind, 2001; Van Prooijen, Van den
Bos, & Wilke, 2003). It might therefore be that predictions from
fairness heuristic theory and the uncertainty management model
are less generalizable to group dynamic contexts than has been
recognized before. Be that as it may, the current research should
not be viewed as a refutation of fairness heuristic theory and the
uncertainty management model. After all, there are more studies
available that support predictions of these theories (e.g., Van den
Bos, 2001; Van den Bos et al., 1997; Van den Bos & Miedema,
2000; Van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998; Van den Bos, Wilke,
Lind, & Vermunt, 1998; for overviews, see Lind & Van den Bos,
2002; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002) than studies that fail to support
predictions from these theories (Van den Bos & Lind, 2001; Van
Prooijen et al., 2003). Nevertheless, the current study (as well as
the studies reported in Van den Bos & Lind, 2001, and Van
Prooijen et al., 2003) suggests that the processes advanced by
fairness heuristic theory and the uncertainty management model
are not entirely unconditional. An important direction for future
procedural justice research would therefore be to explore in which
types of social settings predictions by these theories may or may
not be supported.
To conclude, the current studies add to our understanding of
group membership in procedural justice by showing that level of
inclusion by people’s peers may moderate procedural fairness
effects. Level of inclusion is an essential element of group mem-
bership (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and group membership is
related to the psychology of procedural justice (Cropanzano et al.,
2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler &
Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van Prooijen et al., in press).
We have shown that effects of voice as opposed to no-voice
procedures become stronger at higher levels of inclusion. Whether
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people are socially included or excluded by their peers therefore is
an important moderator of their reactions to procedural justice.
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